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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

KRISTIAN v. COMCAST: ANOTHER DROP IN THE BUCKET, OR
THE ACHILLES HEEL OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
BANNING CLASS MECHANISMS?

I. INTRODUCTION
The average American routinely becomes a party to contracts. Frequently,
these are standard form contracts between an individual consumer and a
corporation, which are drafted by the corporation. More often than not
consumers barely read, let alone comprehend, the implications and
consequences of contracts they enter into. Over the last few decades as the
practicality of and deference to arbitration has risen and as corporations have
faced an ever-growing need to avoid major litigation, arbitration clauses have
been included in contracts between the ordinary consumer and the corporate
seller. Now, within the last decade, the trend has gone from the mere inclusion
of an arbitration clause to also include a ban on class mechanisms in the
arbitral forum. The result for claimants is that they must arbitrate their claims,
and must do so on an individual basis. Far too often, consumers are unaware
of such class action waivers or are unable to understand them until a dispute
arises.
As illustrated by a recent decision in the Fourth Circuit where parties
signed a contract with a mandatory arbitration clause and a ban on class
mechanisms, great injustice and difficulty can result for consumers subject to
such provisions.1 In Davis v. ECPI College of Technology, forty-seven
different individuals had claims against ECPI. In order to arbitrate, and not
consolidate the claims, there would have to be “47 different hearings with 47
different arbitrators.”2 This would result in:
An expert [on the case being required] to testify 47 [different] times. Other
witnesses, such as former teachers and staff at ECPI, would need to appear to
testify 47 separate times (likely resulting in a loss of current employment).
Due to the commonality of issues and evidence in all 47 cases, each of the 47

1. Davis v. ECPI Coll. of Tech., L.C., 227 F. App’x 250 (4th Cir. 2007).
2. Brief of Appellee at 6–8, Davis v. ECPI Coll. of Tech., L.C., No. 05-2122 (4th Cir. Jun.
12, 2006). The court noted that this is “precisely the reason why consolidation of cases should be
and typically is ordered.” Id. The issue before the court was how claims should be arbitrated. Id.
The district court held that “absent consolidation, the ability of the Plaintiffs to obtain any relief
by way of arbitration is severely compromised.” Id. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a)
(allowing courts to consolidate actions where there is a “common question of law or fact”).
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original Claimants is a witness in all 47 cases (resulting in 47 testimonies in 47
hearings or, collectively, 2,209 testimonies). [There are further multiplicities]
with individual arbitrators conducting many hours of telephone conferences in
each separate case, with multiple briefs requested, and multiple dates for
3
submissions, all to be conducted and heard separately, 47 times.

Due to the conflict between the complications claimants face when forced
to arbitrate small claims individually and corporate interests in dealing with
disputes privately and in a cost and time-efficient manner, the inclusion of
class action waivers has created confusion among and within the federal
circuits, and among and within state courts.4 Under the Federal Arbitration
Act (“FAA”), courts are supposed to enforce arbitration agreements as they are
written.5 Where a contract is silent on whether or not arbitration can proceed
as a class, all federal circuit courts have held there can be no class arbitration.6
However, there are discrepancies among lower federal courts and among state
courts.7 Moreover, when arbitration agreements explicitly prohibit class
mechanisms, federal circuit courts, as well as state courts, are split on whether
arbitration is then a valid form of dispute resolution at all.8
On April 20, 2006, the First Circuit, in Kristian v. Comcast, held that a ban
on class mechanisms in a mandatory arbitration clause was unenforceable and
severable where plaintiffs’ claims were based on state and federal antitrust law
because plaintiffs would be unable to vindicate their statutory rights under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.9 The Court’s decision is novel in that it is

3. Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 8–9. The district court, in support of its finding that
consolidating arbitration in this case was the only way to allow Plaintiffs to vindicate their rights,
recognized that “[i]t can be predicted without fear of contradiction that ECPI’s lawyers intend to
make these 47 separate proceedings as costly and as difficult as possible for the Plaintiffs.”
Therefore, it seems this also played a role in the court’s decision. Id. at 9.
4. See Cari K. Dawson, Arbitration Agreements: No Longer Defendants’ Silver Bullet to
Defeat Class Actions, 22 ANDREWS CORP. OFFICERS AND DIR. LIAB. LITIG. REP. 13 (2007).
5. See Alan S. Kaplinsky, Arbitration and Class Actions: A Contradiction in Terms, in
PRACTISING LAW INST., 11TH ANNUAL CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION INSTITUTE
117 (2006). At the time Kaplinsky wrote his article “[t]hree federal courts of appeals and several
federal district courts [had] considered whether an arbitration may proceed on a class-wide basis,
and they [all] unanimously concluded that it may not absent a provision in the arbitration
agreement or the applicable arbitration rules specifically authorizing class arbitration.” Id. at 101.
See also Joshua S. Lipshutz, The Court’s Implicit Roadmap: Charting the Prudent Course at the
Juncture of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Lawsuits, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1677, 1679 (2005) (noting that since the 1980s “[p]redispute arbitration agreements are
enforceable bilateral contracts binding the parties as any other contract would, and the Federal
Arbitration Act [FAA] ensures that courts will treat such contracts on equal footing with all other
contracts”).
6. Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1682.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 54 (1st Cir. 2006).
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only the second federal circuit court, out of the six to consider the issue, to find
such an agreement unenforceable.10 More importantly, it is the first circuit
court to base its decision on a vindication of statutory rights theory. The
purpose of this Note is to explore this decision and to determine its role in
resolving confusion among the courts.
This Note first reviews the history and policy behind arbitration in the
United States. Second, it reviews the policy and history behind class actions.
Third, it provides a summary of cases upholding arbitration agreements.
Fourth, it addresses the conflict created among courts due to the growing trend
of banning class mechanisms in mandatory arbitration agreements. Fifth, it
analyzes the decision in Kristian v. Comcast and the unenforceability of class
action waivers under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Finally, this Note
examines the affects of Kristian v. Comcast on this unclear area of law and
predicts how future courts will utilize the decision.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The use of arbitration, the process by which the parties to a dispute submit
their differences to the judgment of an impartial person or group of persons
appointed by the mutual consent of the parties, only arose as a common and
accepted method of dispute resolution in the United States in the last fifty
years.11 Even though its widespread usage in the United States is recent,
arbitration dates back to Greek mythology12 and “was an established method of
dispute resolution among merchants and in the maritime industry in precolonial England.”13 While there are traces of arbitration in America’s early
history, its wide-spread appeal, popularity, and application are recent.14
A.

Arbitration Policy and the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925

When America was first settled, arbitration concepts borrowed from
English common law were used to resolve disputes quickly, efficiently, and
with little cost to the parties.15 While arbitration was used with some level of
frequency, its enforcement was entirely voluntary.16 Moreover, it was initially

10. See infra Part V.B.
11. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, ARBITRATION: COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, INSURANCE, AND
TORT CLAIMS 3 (Alan I. Widiss ed., Practicing Law Institute 1979).
12. STEVEN C. BENNETT, ARBITRATION: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS 9 (2002).
13. Id.
14. See Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1678 (“In the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court changed its
outlook on arbitration agreements, ushering a new era in which arbitration agreements between
companies and consumers would be not only allowed but ‘favored.’”). See generally id.;
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 11, at 3.
15. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 9.
16. Id.
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used only by commercial or trade groups.17 The very essence of arbitration
was that it was voluntarily agreed to by both parties as a means of resolving
disputes quickly and cost efficiently.18 During America’s formative years, the
enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitration itself “depended on
community ties and pressures for its effectiveness.”19 Trade groups created
their own rules of dispute resolution which were enforced by elders and the
community as a whole.20
As America grew and emerged as an industrial nation, these community
ties weakened, and the trust inherent in arbitration lessened.21 As a result,
arbitration became even less appealing to parties.22 Where parties did arbitrate,
which was normally between businesses or sophisticated, business-minded
people contracting, agreements to arbitrate went from informal oral agreements
to written agreements or contracts to arbitrate.23 Still, inherent in these formal
written documents was the equal standing of the parties and their voluntary
choice to submit their disputes to arbitration.24 Throughout this period,
arbitration was not a favored method of dispute resolution and was largely
frowned upon by the courts.25 In fact, “under the common law rule, a party to
an arbitration agreement could revoke the agreement at any time, up to the
point that the arbitrator rendered a decision.”26
However, into the twentieth century, and with the rise of labor unions,
“both unions and management increasingly recognized that all parties needed a
speedy, inexpensive and fair method to resolve the numerous disputes that
arose in the context of modern industrial operations.”27 Also, with the growth
of the country, there was a growing dissatisfaction with the justice system due
to “excessive delay, expense, inflexibility, and judicial gridlock.”28 A need for

17. KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 308 (2000).
18. See id. at 309–10; see also Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1678. Before 1980, arbitration
normally occurred between two businesses, not individual people or an individual and a
company. Id. Also, public policy tended to disfavor arbitration and it was not considered
mandatory or binding unless the parties agreed to it. See id. at 1678–79. Public policy was
strongly opposed to enforcing mandatory arbitration between a corporation and an individual
consumer. Id. at 1678.
19. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 9.
20. STONE, supra note 17, at 10.
21. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 9.
22. Id.; see also STONE, supra note 17, at 4.
23. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 9.
24. See STONE, supra note 17, at 378.
25. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 10.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. STONE, supra note 17, at 2.
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another body, other than the courts, to preside over cases and render decisions
was growing.29
Shortly thereafter, in 1925, the FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§1–14, was enacted by the
United States Congress.30 In spite of the FAA’s recognition of the validity and
enforceability of arbitration agreements, courts and legislatures continued to be
skeptical of arbitration.31 In fact, throughout the 1920’s, and even into later
decades, several states restricted arbitration to present disputes.32 It was not
until several decades after implementation of the FAA that state legislatures
began allowing parties to contract to arbitrate their future disputes.33 The
courts, as well as state legislatures, did not really begin accepting arbitration as
a legitimate course of dispute resolution until arbitration agreements in the area
of international law arose.34 Gradually, as the Supreme Court saw the
usefulness of arbitration in international agreements, it grew more and more
sympathetic toward arbitration in the domestic sphere as well.35
B.

Federal Arbitration Act and Its Expanding Scope

When the FAA was adopted in 1925, “it provide[d] for arbitration
agreements in contracts involving maritime transactions and contracts
evidencing transactions involving interstate or foreign commerce.”36 The FAA
essentially made agreements to arbitrate enforceable and gave them the same
rights as any other contract.37 After several landmark decisions, the FAA
became applicable to seemingly intra-state transactions as well.38 Under the
FAA, “[a] written provision. . . in an agreement. . . shall be ‘valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.’”39 In essence, the implementation of the FAA and
its current translation “wipe away decades of judicial hostility toward
arbitration.”40 Now, agreements to arbitrate, even between major
29. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 10.
30. STONE, supra note 17, at 313.
31. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 11.
32. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 11, at 3.
33. Id.
34. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 11.
35. Id.
36. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 11, at 4–5; see also STONE, supra note 17, at
313; William M. Howard, Annotation, Validity of Arbitration Clause Precluding Class Actions,
13 A.L.R. 6TH 145 (2006) (“The Federal Arbitration Act . . . provides for the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate in contracts involving interstate commerce or maritime transactions,
which it deems valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.”).
37. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 17.
38. See generally id. at 17–18.
39. Id. at 18–19; see also Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
40. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 19.
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conglomerates and the common consumer, are “as enforceable as any other
contract.”41 Consumers are constantly faced with mandatory arbitration
clauses in connection with their landline and cellular telephones, credit cards,
cable services, health care providers, and commercial and residential leases.42
Also, under the FAA, courts have the power to stay litigation and require
parties to arbitrate if they have so contracted.43
C. Arbitration Policy Today
Since the 1980s, federal policy has been very much in favor of
arbitration.44 Throughout the years, the Supreme Court has held that
arbitration agreements are enforceable in both federal and state courts.45
Arbitration can now be used as a form of dispute resolution in nearly every
case with a contractual element.46 Where consumers have attacked alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms contained in standard form contracts of
adhesion, courts have regularly upheld the contracts on the ground the parties
were able to choose their dispute settlement procedure.47 Under this theory,
courts say the parties are not giving up any substantive rights, and for that
reason, arbitration can be upheld.48
Arbitration agreements in contracts of adhesion between corporations and
the average consumer are now commonplace and enforceable.49 However, as
this Note will address, forcing consumers to arbitrate claims pursuant to an
agreement in a standard form contract can sometimes cause injustice and
preclude consumers from being able to vindicate their statutory rights.50 It is
in such cases that the courts are in conflict.51

41. Id.; see also STONE, supra note 17, at 378; Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1678.
42. STONE, supra note 17, at iii; Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1678–79.
43. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 20; see also Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1679 (“[E]ven when
such contracts are deemed ‘adhesive’ by courts, meaning that the consumer was essentially forced
to either accept the contract along with the product or service he was purchasing or reject both
together, mandatory arbitration agreements have been deemed to be enforceable.”).
44. Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1678.
45. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 11.
46. STONE, supra note 17, at 378.
47. See Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1678–79.
48. Id. at 1680.
49. Id. at 1678.
50. See generally Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006).
51. See generally Kaplinsky, supra note 5; Lipshutz, supra note 5. See also infra Part IV.
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III. HISTORY AND POLICY OF CLASS ACTIONS
Because class actions and arbitration seem to be “contradiction[s] in
terms,” the history and policy behind class actions is of great relevance.52
Class actions, unlike arbitration, have been incorporated into the American
legal system with little controversy.53 Class action mechanisms were first
adopted by American courts in the nineteenth century, and in 1983, Rule 23,
the rule regulating class actions, was added to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.54 The original draft of the rule was uncontroversial but proved to
be unworkable.55 Rule 23 was entirely rewritten by the Advisory Committee
in 1966 and is followed by federal courts today.56
There are three main purposes of Rule 23.57 First, it is intended to promote
judicial economy by preventing multiple suits on the same subject matter,
which would slow judicial processes.58 Under 23(b)(1) a class action may be
maintained where requiring individuals to bring separate claims would create a
risk of “inconsistent or varying adjudications. . . which would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class.”59 Second,
Rule 23 is meant to provide relief to those who would not otherwise be able to
bring a suit individually where common relief is sought.60 For example, an
individual generally will not bring a suit, absent class mechanisms, where his
claim is very small or where the costs of litigation would outweigh the possible
recovery.61 Third, Rule 23 was amended so that where multiple suits would be
brought on the same claim or issue, class actions can ensure uniformity of
decisions.62 Under Rule 23(c), notice of a lawsuit is to be given to all potential

52. See generally Kaplinsky, supra note 5, at 99.
53. Defense News: Class Action Reform Gets a Shot in the Arm, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 263, 264
(2002) [hereinafter Defense News] (“In 1938, Rule 23 was included in the new Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The rule was adopted with little fanfare or discussion.”).
54. Id.
55. Id. The original version of Rule 23, which was drafted in 1938 “divided class actions
into three categories: the ‘true,’ the ‘hybrid’ and the ‘spurious.’ These categories, with their
infelicitous names and formalistic attributes, proved difficult to apply.” Id.
56. Id.
57. Buford v. H&R Block, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 340, 345 (S.D. Ga. 1996).
58. Id. (citing Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1974) (“Class actions
serve three essential purposes: (1) to facilitate judicial economy by the avoidance of multiple suits
on the same subject matter.”).
59. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1); see also Defense News, supra note 53, at 264.
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2); see also Buford, 168 F.R.D. at 345–46 (citing Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutt, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (noting that a second essential purpose of class
actions is “to provide a feasible means for asserting the rights of those who ‘would have no
realistic day in court if a class action were not available’”).
61. Defense News, supra note 53, at 264.
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also Buford, 168 F.R.D. at 346 (citing First Fed. of Mich. v.
Barrow, 878 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 1989)).
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class members as well as notice of possible settlement.63 The rule also
provides that “class members could be bound if they [do] not affirmatively opt
out of (b)(3) damage class actions.”64
Rule 23 was initially envisioned as a way to facilitate civil rights class
actions under subsection (b)(2).65 While this purpose was served, law makers
were unable to foresee the massive expansion of class action litigation that
followed due to the opt-out provision under subsection (b)(3).66 Initially, class
actions were not perceived as encompassing, for example, mass tort litigation,
as they regularly do today.67 The advisory committee even noted that “[a]
‘mass accident’ resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not
appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant
questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would
be present, affecting the individuals in different ways.”68 This committee note
suggests that Rule 23, while intended to facilitate class actions, was never
intended to have the scope, in terms of the number of class actions and
members joining classes, that it has today.
In fact, the advisory committee sought to limit the broad scope of Rule 23
on several occasions. Most notably, in 1992, the committee sought to change
the “opt-out” provision of Rule 23(b)(3), which is the provision of the rule
most often used by those seeking class status.69 The draft would give courts
the ability to certify a class as “opt-in” or as “opt-out.”70 In this way, courts
could limit the number of class members to a suit who may not have ordinarily
filed suit on their own or were too indifferent to opt out.
One negative aspect of the “opt out” provisions is that even those who
have no interest in the litigation can be joined to a lawsuit if they do not
affirmatively “opt out.” It does not follow, however, that those who are joined
because they failed to take any action would have chosen to “opt in.” First,
class members who have genuine claims but wish to join as a class will see
their rewards reduced if they have to be split amongst everyone in a class, even
those who were not interested in bringing a claim. Second, by not opting out

63. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c); see also Defense News, supra note 53, at 264.
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c); see also Defense News, supra note 53, at 264.
65. Defense News, supra note 53, at 264 (“It is probably fair to say that the 1966 committee
was most interested in facilitating civil rights class actions for injunctive relief under b(2), and in
this respect the committee's intentions were fully realized.”).
66. Id. at 264–65 ("[I]n adopting the 'opt-out' approach, the committee apparently had in
mind small claim, consumer class actions in which no one class member would have a sufficient
interest to litigate an individual claim and in which the forces of inertia might be greater than a
potential class member's desire to participate, given the small stakes involved.").
67. Id. at 265.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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of a class action suit, an individual is then barred from bringing an independent
action and is bound by the decision given in the class action case.
In sum, while class actions have generally been approved by society and
have not met with controversy as arbitration provisions have, their scope is
greater than originally intended and has produced negative results for both
those needing or wishing to join as a class and those who wish to bring claims
individually.71 As this Note will address, questions over this broadened scope
of class actions, coupled with expansion of mandatory arbitration provisions,
has created a rift among and between state and federal courts.
IV. CLASS ACTIONS AND ARBITRATION: A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS?72
The debate over class arbitration has resulted in “a kaleidoscope of
conflicting decisions [which continue] to emerge across state and federal
courts nationwide, and [which produce] seemingly inconsistent rulings within
a single jurisdiction.”73 While Kristian is novel in that a circuit court has never
refused to enforce a mandatory arbitration provision banning class mechanisms
on a theory of vindication of statutory rights, the split between the courts is
not. To shed more light on the context in which Kristian was decided, this
Note will now discuss case law preceding the First Circuit’s decision.
A.

Arbitration v. Class Actions

While the majority of courts uphold arbitration agreements explicitly as
they are written, there is some confusion among state courts where the
agreements are vague or silent on the issue of class arbitration.74 Moreover,
both federal and state courts are in discord where arbitration agreements
explicitly ban class mechanisms. Most frequently, where arbitration has been
held enforceable, courts have relied on state unconscionability statutes.75
Until the First Circuit’s decision in Kristian, all other federal courts that
considered whether arbitration may proceed on a class-wide basis, including
three federal circuit courts and multiple federal district courts, held that it
cannot where the arbitration agreement does not specifically authorize class
arbitration.76 Therefore, if a contract was silent as to whether claims could be
arbitrated as a class, the default rule was that they could not. In reaching this

71. See Buford v. H&R Block, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 340, 345 (S.D. Ga. 1996); see also supra
text accompanying notes 65–68. See generally Defense News, supra note 53.
72. See generally Kaplinsky, supra note 5.
73. Dawson, supra note 4, at 2.
74. Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1682.
75. Id.
76. Kaplinsky, supra note 5, at 117. See also Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1682.
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holding, federal courts relied on Section 4 of the FAA.77 Rule 4 of the FAA
states:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition . . . for an order
directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such
agreement. . . . The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that
the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith
is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to
78
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

Based on Rule 4 of the FAA, courts will generally look to the agreement
between the parties to determine if they intended to arbitrate, and intended to
do so on a class-wide basis.79 As held by the first federal courts to consider the
issue, courts may only direct parties to arbitrate, and to do so on a class-wide
basis, if the parties so agreed.80 Moreover, Supreme Court precedent dictates
that the national policy in favor of arbitration is so strong that arbitration
should be enforced even if multiple individual suits must be brought.81
Even where a statute provides for class action litigation, such as the Truth
in Lending Act (“TILA”), the Supreme Court has held there is no statutory
right to join as a class.82 This is because there is “no congressional intent to
preclude the enforcement of arbitration clauses in [the TILA’s] text, legislative
history, or purpose,” and therefore arbitration clauses are still enforceable even
if class action litigation is unavailable.83 While these decisions clearly conflict
with the policy of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which allows class
actions to be maintained for judicial economy, common injunctive relief and
uniformity of decisions, there is ultimately not a right to class actions, and
“[n]othing prevents [p]laintiffs from contracting away their right to a class
action.”84

77. Kaplinsky, supra note 5, at 117.
78. Id. (emphasis added) (citing The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, § 4).
79. Id. (because parties did not agree to arbitrate on a class-wide basis, the court is powerless
to require it).
80. Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Disc. Co., 828 F.Supp. 673, 674 (D. Minn. 1993) (holding
that the “[c]ourt must give effect to the agreement of the parities and this arbitration agreement
makes no provision for class treatment or disputes”). The court ultimately held it was without the
power to order arbitration. Id. See also Kaplinsky, supra note 5, at 118–21 (citing McCarthy v.
Providential Corp., 1994 WL 387852 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 1994); Howard v. Klynveld Peat
Marwick Goerderler, 977 F.Supp. 654, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc.,
55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995); Coleman v. Nat’l Movie-Dine, Inc. 449 F.Supp. 945, 947–48 (E.D.
Pa. 1978)).
81. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F.Supp. 1410, 1414 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
82. Id. at 1418 (‘“[TILA] does not create a ‘statutory right to pursue class actions.’”).
83. Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000).
84. Kaplinsky, supra note 5, at 120 (citing Zawikowski v. Beneficial Nat. Bank, 1999 WL
35304, *2 (N.D.Ill. 1999)); see also Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 269, 271 (7th Cir.
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Federal court decisions in favor of arbitration at all costs have even gone
so far as to limit the seemingly all-encompassing legal power of arbitrators.
Even though arbitrators are to “have all powers provided by law, including all
legal and equitable remedies,” federal courts have held that they do not have
the power to require or permit class action litigation unless the agreement
specifically provides.85 Under the FAA, an agreement to arbitrate is supposed
to be on equal footing with any other contract.86 For this reason, all federal
courts and most state courts hold that arbitrators must view the language of
arbitration agreements strictly and cannot imply class treatment was intended
where the agreement was vague or silent on the issue of class mechanisms.87
Even so, while federal courts have concluded that arbitration provisions,
absent express language to the contrary, are to be performed on an individual
basis, they have not been unanimous in reaching that result.88 For example, the
Third Circuit required strict enforcement of arbitration agreements in 2000, but
in 1999, that same court held that “the inability to obtain class-wide relief
‘seems contrary to the underlying purpose of the TILA.’”89 In fact, most
federal court decisions upholding arbitration were made by appellate courts
overturning the decisions of federal district courts. The conflict is not
exclusive to the federal courts as state courts are also at odds on issues
involving arbitration and the common consumer.90 Because there is discord
among courts as to class treatment when agreements to arbitrate are vague or
silent, many corporations began including explicit bans on class mechanisms in
their arbitration agreements.91 In this effort to end confusion, they “opened a
new can of worms.”92

1995). In Champ, the plaintiff brought a class action complaint against the defendant under
RICO and state laws. Id. The plaintiff claimed that she had a right to proceed as a class even if
she had to arbitrate because the FAA is silent on the issue of class action litigation and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 81(a)(3) “provides that in proceedings under the FAA, the federal rules
apply to the extent not provided for in the FAA.” Id. The 7th Circuit rejected this argument,
noting that the FAA requires that arbitration agreements be enforced according to their express
terms, whereas Rule 81 applies only to judicial proceedings. Id. at 276. Basically, Rule 81 is
only meant to be a gap filler and through its “express terms” the FAA has already covered class
actions by saying arbitration agreements must be strictly enforced according to their terms.
85. Kaplinsky, supra note 5, at 120 (citing Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Corrin, Civil
Action No. 97-74729 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 25, 1998)).
86. See generally Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1679.
87. Kaplinsky, supra note 5, at 119.
88. See generally Lipshutz, supra note 5.
89. Kaplinsky, supra note 5, at 119 (citing Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc., 82 F.Supp. 2d 264
(D. Del. 1999)).
90. Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1682.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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While most courts still enforce arbitration where there is an explicit ban on
class mechanisms, several courts, most notably in California and the Ninth
Circuit, have held that in these cases arbitration agreements are unenforceable.
The California Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit based their decisions on
state unconscionability statutes.93 While the First Circuit’s holding in Kristian
was not based on unconscionability, the court found it persuasive and
somewhat analogous to a vindication of statutory rights theory.94
Generally, there are two prongs to unconscionability, and both must be
proved.95 First, a contract must be substantively unconscionable.96 This
means the terms of the contract must unfairly burden one party and unfairly
favor another such that no reasonable person would agree to the terms and no
honest person would accept them.97 Second, a contract must be procedurally
unconscionable.98 This determination “focuses on the bargaining conditions
under which the parties agreed to the contract.”99 This is based in part on the
sophistication and bargaining power of the parties.100 Unconscionability
statutes are used in the context of arbitration “to achieve [a] state’s public
policy goal of ensuring that plaintiffs will have an opportunity to bring class
action suits against companies.”101
V. KRISTIAN V. COMCAST
While bans on class arbitration have only been included in standard form
contracts within the last ten to fifteen years and were consistently upheld in the
majority of state and federal courts, there is still a great deal of confusion and
inconsistency in rulings.102 Even the Supreme Court has found “artful ways to
dodge these thorny [issues].”103 However, in an attempt to elucidate this
unclear area of law, the First Circuit decided Kristian v. Comcast and provided
a detailed analysis of its decision. This Note will now provide the facts,
holding and reasoning of that case.
A.

Procedural History

Martha Kristian (“Kristian”) represented a class of plaintiffs (Plaintiffs)
who received cable service from Comcast Corporation (“Comcast”) in Boston,
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 60 (1st Cir. 2006).
Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1694.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1695.
Id.
Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1696.
See generally Kaplinsky, supra note 5.
Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1683.
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Massachusetts.104 The Plaintiffs filed complaints in both state and federal
court claiming that Comcast and its predecessor in interest inflated the costs of
their cable services “as a result of anticompetitive practices.”105 Comcast,
pursuant to a mandatory arbitration provision in its Policies & Practices,
sought to force arbitration.106 Thereafter, Plaintiffs claimed that Comcast’s
arbitration policies did not apply to them as they were added after the plaintiffs
began receiving service from Comcast, and that even if the arbitration
agreement could apply, it was unenforceable because it precluded all class
actions.107 Ultimately, the First Circuit held that Comcast’s arbitration policies
did apply retroactively.108 Even so, it held the policies were unenforceable
because they precluded class actions and therefore precluded Plaintiffs from
vindicating their statutory rights under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.109
B.

Facts

The Plaintiffs began receiving cable service from Comcast between 1987
and 1999.110 During that period, Comcast’s contracts did not contain
arbitration agreements.111 However, “in 2001, Comcast began including an
arbitration provision in the terms and conditions governing the relationship
between Comcast and its subscribers.”112 In 2002, the arbitration provision
was amended and differed substantially from the 2001 policies.113 Both the
2002 and 2003 Comcast Policies & Procedures required mandatory arbitration
and banned all forms of class representation.114 Comcast’s 2002/2003 Policies
104. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2006). Plaintiffs-Appellees were
James D. Masterman, Paul Pinella, Jack Rogers, and Martha Kristian. Id. All were Boston area
subscribers for Comcast's services. Id. They began receiving service in 1987, 1991, 1994, and
1999 respectively. Id. The mandatory arbitration provision was not added until 2001. Id. The
ban on class action waivers was not added until 2002/2003. Id. All four Plaintiffs received
notice of the change in terms along with their statements in November of each year. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 31.
108. Id. at 64.
109. Id.
110. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 30.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 31–32. The 2002/2003 Comcast Policies & Practices, in relevant part, provided in
bold capital letters:
If we are unable to resolve informally any claim or dispute, we have agreed to binding
arbitration. There shall be no right or authority for any claims to be arbitrated on a class
action or consolidated basis or on a bases involving claims brought in a purported
representative capacity on behalf of the general public (such as a private attorney general),
other subscribers, or other person similarly situated unless your state's laws provide
otherwise.
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and Practices were at the center of this dispute.115 Each cable subscriber
received notice of the terms and conditions of subscription upon installation of
cable.116 None of the Plaintiffs received this notice because they subscribed
prior to the inclusion of the arbitration agreements.117 However, Comcast sent
notice of the amended Policies & Practices governing subscription to each of
its subscribers, including Plaintiffs, annually.118
In 2003, based on claims of Comcast’s anticompetitive practices, two
groups of plaintiffs separately filed complaints.119 Both complaints ended up
in United States District Court.120 Comcast then sought to compel arbitration
pursuant to its amended terms and conditions.121 Plaintiffs argued that their
complaints arose from problems existing prior to the amended terms and
conditions and therefore were not subject to the mandatory arbitration
provisions.122 Furthermore, even if the provisions did apply, Plaintiffs argued
that the arbitration agreements precluded vindication of their statutory rights
under federal antitrust law, were unconscionable under state law, and were
contrary to public policy.123 The courts presiding over each case found that the
dispute could not be arbitrated because Plaintiffs were customers prior to the
2001, 2002 and 2003 amendments of Comcast’s Policies & Practices and that
the amendments could not apply retroactively.124 The district courts never
addressed whether the arbitration agreements were unconscionable, contrary to
public policy or prevented Plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights.125
Both cases were consolidated for appeal to the First Circuit.126

Id.
115. See generally Kristian, 446 F.3d at 31–32.
116. Id. at 30.
117. Id.
118. Id. Comcast’s new arbitration provision was included in its Policies & Practices and was
sent to “each Boston area subscriber's invoice as a billing stuffer during the November 2001
billing cycle.” Id. The Policies & Practices of Comcast in 2002 and 2003 differed substantially
from the 2001 version. Id. In this case, Comcast relied on the mandatory arbitration and class
action waiver provisions in the 2002/2003 version. Id.
119. Id. at 30–33. Plaintiffs “filed a complaint against Comcast and AT&T Broadband in
Massachusetts state court, alleging a cause of action under the Massachusetts Antitrust Act, Mass.
Gen. Laws. Ch. 93.” Id. Plaintiffs Kristian and Masterson “filed a complaint against Comcast, as
well as several other Comcast entities, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
alleging causes of action under the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26. Id. at 31–32.
120. Id.
121. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 31.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 64.
126. Id. at 31.
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C. First Circuit’s Analysis
Reviewing the district court decisions de novo, the First Circuit first held
that Comcast’s amended terms and conditions, including the relevant
arbitration provisions, did apply retroactively.127 Therefore, Plaintiffs were
subject to the mandatory arbitration agreement pursuant to Comcast’s
2002/2003 Policies & Practices.128 This is the effect of the terms applying
retroactively, even though those terms were not the initial terms under which
Plaintiffs accepted service.
In their appeal, Plaintiffs argued that even if the arbitration agreement
applied to them, arbitration was not a fair and adequate alternative to a court of
law. Thus, Plaintiffs claimed that the mandatory arbitration agreement, even if
applicable, violated their statutory rights because it allowed for limited
discovery, a shortened statute of limitations, barred recovery of treble
damages, precluded plaintiffs from recovering attorney’s fees and prohibited
the use of class mechanisms.129 Plaintiffs’ vindication of statutory rights
argument was based on “the presumption that arbitration provides a fair and
adequate mechanism for enforcing statutory rights.”130 Arbitration’s original
purpose was to serve as an alternative method for dispute resolution where the
parties agreed to be bound,131 and it only remains a legitimate alternative
where it does fairly and adequately enforce statutory rights.132
D. The Supreme Court Trilogy
To determine whether the arbitration agreement’s prohibition on the use of
class mechanisms prevented Plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights,
the court first had to decide whether this was a question that could be answered
by the court itself or whether it had to be answered by an arbitrator.133 While a
court’s jurisdiction is derived from a federal or state constitution, “an
arbitrator’s authority to settle disputes is only established through private

127. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 64.
128. See generally id.
129. Id. at 37.
130. Id. (citing Rosenburg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 14 (1st
Cir. 1999)); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985) (“[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of
action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent
function.”).
131. See generally BENNETT, supra note 12, at 9–10; Kristian, 446 F.3d at 37.
132. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 37 (“[U]nless the arbitral forum provided by a given agreement
provides for the fair and adequate enforcement of a party's statutory rights, the arbitral forum runs
afoul of [the] presumption [of fairness and adequacy] and loses its claim as a valid alternative to
traditional litigation.”).
133. Id. at 37–42.
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contractual arrangements between the parties themselves.”134 As a result, all
issues not explicitly assigned to arbitration through the arbitration agreement
between the parties go to the courts.135 When there is an issue of whether to
arbitrate in the first place, there is an issue of arbitrability.136 Here, Comcast’s
contract was silent as to whether a court or arbitrator was to be the decision
maker if a question of arbitrability arose.137 For the answer, the court looked
to three Supreme Court cases, Howsam,138 PacifiCare,139 and Bazzle,140
referred to as the “Supreme Court Trilogy.”141 The Court ultimately
determined that it could determine the question of arbitrability, not an
arbitrator.142 Because Howsam, Pacificare and Bazzle formed the analysis of
each of the Plaintiff’s statutory rights claims, this Note will now discuss them.
1. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the Supreme Court analyzed
how to determine whether an arbitrator or a court should determine preliminary
matters to an arbitration dispute.143 For this reason the case is relevant to an
understanding of the First Circuit’s decision in Kristian.144
The crux of the dispute in Howsam was an arbitration rule of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) which had a six-year statute of
limitations.145 The defendant argued the arbitration provision was inapplicable
because the dispute between defendant and plaintiff was more than six years
old.146 It was left to the Supreme Court to determine whether a court or an
arbitrator should decide how the NASD rule was meant to apply and whether
or not it applied to the case at hand.147 In Howsam, the Court found that the
parties did not intend for a court to decide the proper application of the NASD
rule, but instead intended the question to be decided by an arbitrator.148
Generally, there is a presumption that parties would prefer a court to
determine whether a dispute should be submitted to arbitration pursuant to

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1684.
Id. at 1685.
Id.
Kristian, 446 F.3d at 31–32.
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003).
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
Kristian, 446 F.3d at 37.
Id. at 53–54.
Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84–85.
Kristian, 446 F.3d at 37.
Howsam, 537 U.S. at 81.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 82–83.
Id. at 83.
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their arbitration agreement.149 This determination is described as the
“interpretive rule.”150 Ultimately, a court determines whether the parties
ordinarily would have intended a court or an arbitrator to settle “questions of
arbitrability.”151 If a court finds the parties intended for questions of
arbitrability to be determined by a court, then they will be.152 Likewise, if it is
clear and unmistakable that the parties wanted an arbitrator to decide the
applicability of arbitration provisions, then the “interpretive rule” will not
apply and an arbitrator, not a court, will decide the case.153
To simplify the application of this rule, the Supreme Court listed two types
of disputes where courts rather than arbitrators will resolve gateway “questions
of arbitrability.”154 First, courts will generally resolve the dispute where it is
“about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause.”155 Second,
courts will decide gateway issues where they are about whether an arbitration
agreement in a binding contract can apply to a particular type of
controversy.156 However, this is merely a presumption and can be waived by
the parties through contract.157
Moreover, where an arbitrator to a specific dispute would have far more
expertise than a judge, the arbitrator should preside over the case.158 This rule
is known as the “concept of comparative expertise.”159 In Howsam, the NASD
arbitrators had far more expertise than a judge in understanding their own
rules. A NASD arbitrator would be in a better position to understand, interpret
and apply NASD rules. Therefore, where the parties are silent on whether a
court or arbitrator will determine “questions of arbitrability,” the rule of
comparative expertise may also apply.160
Here, the Supreme Court was seeking to create rules which would uncover
the parties’ intentions.161 This accomplishes the goal of the FAA, which is that
an arbitration agreement should be treated “like any other contract, in which
the intentions of the parties are paramount.”162

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 82.
Id. at 83.
Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 84–85.
Id. at 84.
Id.
Id.
Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1687.
Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85.
Kristian v. Comcast, 446 F.3d 25, 39 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85).
Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85.
Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1687.
Id.
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2. Pacificare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book and Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. Bazzle
Shortly after its decision in Howsam the Supreme Court decided
PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book and Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
Bazzle.163 The Court in Kristian relied on both cases to decide whether an
arbitrator or a court should determine if Plaintiffs were precluded from
enforcing their statutory rights through mandatory arbitration.164
In PacifiCare, several healthcare management organizations (“HMOs”)
were facing claims by a group of physicians under a Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) statute.165 The HMOs sought to compel
arbitration.166 The physicians claimed they could not be compelled to arbitrate
because of the conflict between the type of damages allowed under RICO and
the arbitration provision.167 As a result of the conflict, the physicians claimed
they would be unable to obtain “meaningful relief.”168 The HMOs insisted
there was no question of arbitrability, and hence the case should immediately
go to an arbitrator.169
The Supreme Court compelled arbitration.170 It was unclear without
further inquiry whether or not the arbitration agreement conflicted with
RICO.171 If the Court found a conflict, plaintiffs would be left with no
meaningful cause of action and the validity of the arbitration would therefore
be undermined.172 Due to the strong public policy in favor of arbitration, the
Court concluded that the decision maker in such a case should be an
arbitrator.173 The Court reasoned that it is not its job to speculate as to how an
arbitrator might rule.174 Therefore, when an arbitrator’s decision will
determine whether there is a conflict between an arbitration provision and
governing law, “a court should not foreclose the operation of that presumption
by deciding that there is a question of arbitrability when there is the possibility
that an arbitrator’s decision in the first instance would obviate the need for
judicial decision making.”175

163. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 39–40; see also PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S.
401 (2003); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
164. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 39–40.
165. PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 402.
166. Id. at 403.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 403–04.
170. Id. at 407.
171. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 40 (1st Cir. 2006).
172. Id. (citing PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 406–07).
173. PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 407 n.2.
174. Id. at 406–07.
175. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 40.
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Lastly, the First Circuit considered the Supreme Court’s decision in Bazzle.
The contract in Bazzle was between a commercial lender and its customers. It
provided for mandatory arbitration but was silent on the issue of class action
arbitration.176 The commercial lender, Green Tree, claimed arbitration could
not be conducted as a class because the arbitration agreement did not
specifically authorize class mechanisms.177
The Court, to the dismay of many, did not rule as to whether or not
arbitration could proceed on a class-wide basis where the language of a
contract is ambiguous.178 Instead, the Court held that because the contract
itself did not address class arbitration, its terms were unclear and “‘present[ed]
a disputed issue of contract interpretation.’”179 Therefore, instead of
determining whether or not the arbitration could proceed on a class-wide basis,
the Court addressed who should be the decision-maker in the case, an arbitrator
or a court.180
Essentially, Bazzle means that where a contract is silent or ambiguous as to
whether arbitration can proceed as a class, a procedural gateway issue is
created.181 As such, it is something courts will assume the parties intended an
arbitrator decide.182 Bazzle did not involve a gateway matter but a dispute as to
the type of arbitration agreement the parties entered.183 Because such a dispute
does not involve state statutes or judicial procedures, but instead “concerns
contract interpretation and arbitration procedures,” an arbitrator, and not a
court, should be the decision-maker.184 Therefore, when there is a dispute as to
what type of arbitration the parties agreed to, under Bazzle, an arbitrator should
resolve the dispute.
D. Summary and Application of the Trilogy
The First Circuit in Kristian relied on the three preceding cases to form its
decision.185 The Supreme Court’s decision in Howsam informed the court that
in certain situations there is a general presumption that the parties would prefer

176. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003).
177. Id. at 447.
178. Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1699.
179. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 41 (citing Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 450).
180. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452–53.
181. Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1700.
182. Id.
183. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 41; see also Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452–53 (The court stated that when
the dispute is only as to what type of arbitration applies, an arbitrator and not a court should be
the decision-maker because “that question does not concern a state statute or judicial procedure.
It concerns contract interpretation and arbitration procedure. Arbitrators are well situated to
answer that question.”).
184. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453.
185. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 39.
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a court and not an arbitrator preside over their case.186 There are two such
instances, both of which apply to substantive gateway matters: 1) whether the
parties ever agreed to arbitrate; and 2) whether the arbitration agreement
applies to the given controversy.187 However, where the gateway issue is
procedural in nature courts should assume that the parties intended an
arbitrator preside over their case. In PacifiCare, the Supreme Court added that
where resolution of the controversy determines whether the case will be
subject to arbitration, the courts should defer to arbitrators.188 The reasoning is
that courts should not take it upon themselves to speculate as to what decision
an arbitrator will reach where the arbitrator’s initial decision could make a
judicial decision unnecessary.189 Finally, in Bazzle, the Supreme Court held
that where the parties agreed to arbitrate but are in dispute as to what form
arbitration is to take, such as when a contract is silent, an arbitrator shall make
the decision.190
In Kristian, Plaintiffs contended that the “Policies & Practices as a whole
[were] valid.”191 However, they contended the arbitration agreement was
invalid because when it was applied to their anti-trust claim it precluded them
from getting their statutorily guaranteed relief.192 They were not arguing that
the arbitration agreement could not apply in antitrust cases but that “arbitration
subject to the provisions at issue shield[ed] Comcast from antitrust liability,
and hence conflict[ed] with the statute providing for such liability.”193 The
First Circuit determined, based on the Supreme Court Trilogy, that Plaintiff’s
“challenges to the Policies & Practice’s . . . class arbitration bar did pose [a
question] of arbitrability.”194

186. Id. at 39.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 40.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 41.
191. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 41–42.
192. Id. at 42.
193. Id. The Court also noted:
It is true that the district court concluded that the Policies & Practices is a contract of
adhesion. However, under Massachusetts law, contracts of adhesion—like the Policies &
Practices—are generally enforceable absent a separate finding that such contracts are
‘unconscionable, offend public policy, or are shown to be unfair in particular
circumstances.’ The Policies & Practices is not invalid simply because it is a contract of
adhesion.
Id. at 42 n.10 (internal citations omitted).
194. Id. at 64.
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Questions of Arbitrability: Class Arbitration

The Court ultimately concluded that it, and not an arbitrator, was the
proper decision-maker in the Kristian case.195 Comcast, citing Bazzle, claimed
that the issue of whether or not the arbitration could proceed without class
actions was a procedural issue for an arbitrator to decide.196 However, here,
unlike in Bazzle where the contract was silent as to whether class mechanisms
could be utilized, the 2002-2003 arbitration agreement explicitly forbade class
arbitration.197 Also, in Bazzle, there was never a dispute as to whether a ban on
class actions made the arbitration agreement unenforceable.198 Basically, the
question in Kristian was one of arbitrabillity.
Therefore, under Howsam, the controversy over whether the arbitration
agreement was valid was for the courts, and not an arbitrator.199 Kristian did
not fall within the realm of PacifiCare because it was clear by the language of
the agreement that banning all class mechanisms and demanding mandatory
arbitration, in this situation, precluded Plaintiffs from vindicating their
statutory rights.200 In PacifiCare it was unclear whether there really was a
conflict in terms. Therefore, the Court left it up to the arbitrator to determine if
there was in fact a conflict.201 Kristian also was not within the realm of Bazzle
because, in that case, the arbitration agreement was unclear as to whether
arbitration had to proceed on an individual basis or could proceed as a class.202
Here, the arbitration provision clearly forbade class mechanisms.203
Thus, there was a question of whether the agreement was arbitrable at
all.204 Moreover, while the Supreme Court has never faced a case with the
exact facts of Kristian, other federal courts have addressed similar cases and
held that questions of arbitrability similar to those in Kristian should be
submitted for arbitration.205 Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit, in Jenkins v.
First Am. Cash Advance of Georgia,206 faced a similar issue and held there

195. Id.
196. Id. at 53.
197. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 31–32.
198. Id. at 53–54 (quoting Green Tree Servicing Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451 (2003)
(“[Green Tree] does not apply here because of the clarity of the prohibition against class
arbitration”)).
199. Id. at 38–39.
200. Id. at 45.
201. Id. at 40.
202. Id. at 53–54.
203. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 53–54.
204. Id. at 55 (stating that although neither the court nor the Supreme Court, had ever faced a
case exactly similar to Kristian, other courts of appeals had, and had found that there was a
question of arbitrability).
205. Id.
206. Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., 400 F.3d 868 (11th Cir. 2005).
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were questions of arbitrability.207 But ultimately the court in Kristian based its
decision on state unconscionability statutes and not on a vindication of
statutory rights analysis.208 Even so, the Eleventh Circuit previously decided a
case on the basis of “vindication of statutory rights,” and held that the two
rationales were similar.209 Therefore, because this case presented a question of
arbitrability, then, as held in Howsam, the issue of the enforceability of the
arbitration agreement was for the courts.
F.

The Merits in Kristian v. Comcast

In reviewing the merits of Plaintiffs’ claim, the court held that the
“arbitration agreement’s language ostensibly conflict[ed] with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide for class actions.”210 The Court used
the word “ostensibly” because Comcast’s contract precluded only class
arbitration, not class actions.211 Nonetheless, the court held that because
Comcast had a mandatory arbitration provision and because that provision
precluded class arbitration, all class mechanisms were essentially unavailable
to Plaintiffs.212
Because all class mechanisms were banned where there was mandatory
arbitration and a preclusion of class arbitration, the presumption that arbitration
provided “a fair and adequate mechanism for enforcing statutory rights,”213
undermines the very policy behind class actions.214 The policy at the very
center of class actions is that where individual claims are very small, there is
no incentive for a plaintiff to bring an individual claim.215 As a result, that
individual’s rights are never vindicated. This policy was upheld by the
Seventh Circuit, which stated:
It would hardly be an improvement to have in lieu of [a] single class action
17,000,000 suits each seeking $15.00 to $30.00 . . . . The realistic alternative

207. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 55 n.18.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 54. The 2002/2003 arbitration agreement stated the following in bold capital
letters:
There shall be no right or authority for any claims to be arbitrated on a class action or
consolidated basis or on bases involving claims brought in a purported representative
capacity on behalf of the general public (such as a private attorney general), other
subscribers, or other persons similarly situation unless your state’s laws provide
otherwise.
Id. at 53.
211. Id. at 54.
212. Id.
213. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 54 (quoting Rosenburg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
170 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 1999)).
214. Id. (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)).
215. Id.
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to a class action is not 17,000,000 individuals’ suits, but zero individual suits,
216
as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.00.

The court addressed Comcast’s contention that class arbitration was merely
a way to redress claims and not a statutory or substantive right by holding that
it “[could not] ignore the substantive implications of [it as a] procedural
mechanism.”217 If each individual Comcast subscriber brought a claim
individually, recovery would range from a few hundred to a few thousand
dollars.218 Meanwhile, it was estimated that, excluding attorney’s fees and
other fees, the cost of expert fees alone would be hundreds of thousands of
dollars.219 It is highly unlikely that any Comcast subscriber, let alone all those
wishing to bring a claim, had the necessary funds to pay this cost up front.220
Even if Plaintiffs could afford to pay the expert’s fees, it was even extremely
unlikely that they would when only expecting to recover a few hundred to a
few thousand dollars.221
Thus, by explicitly mandating arbitration and explicitly banning class
actions, Plaintiffs would be unable to spread expert’s fees, attorney’s fees, and
other court fees among themselves and would ultimately be deterred from
bringing their claims at all.222 Moreover, as the Supreme Court opined in
Alabama v.Randolph, “the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a
litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the
arbitral forum.”223 Here, the court found the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Randolph certainly applied.224 For this reason the Court held that the ban on
class arbitration precluded Plaintiffs from effectively vindicating their statutory
rights under Rule 23 and was therefore unenforceable.225

216. Id. (citing Carnegie v. Household Int’l Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 54.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 54–55.
222. Id. (quoting Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 407 (2005) (“The class mechanism
ban ‘particularly its implicit ban on spreading across multiple plaintiffs the costs of experts,
depositions, neutrals’ fees, and other disbursements’—forces the putative class member ‘to
assume financial burdens so prohibitive as to deter the bringing of claims. . . . And these
costs . . . will exceed the value of the recovery she is seeking.’”)).
223. Id. at 55 (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)).
224. Id.
225. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 55.
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G. The Comcast Court’s Decision in Comparison to Other Federal Circuit
Courts
The Kristian court noted that the Third, Fourth, Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits upheld bans on class mechanisms in mandatory arbitration agreements
but distinguished the cases before those courts from Kristian.226 First, in each
of the four circuits, either the plaintiffs did not claim that costs were so
prohibitive as to prevent them from being able to vindicate their rights
individually or their arbitration and attorney’s fees were recoverable.227 For
example, the court distinguished the Third Circuit’s holding in Johnson v. West
Suburban Bank because the plaintiffs in Johnson could have recovered
attorney’s fees and they would have been able to find an ample number of
attorneys willing to represent them.228 As such, because Plaintiffs could be
fairly and adequately represented with no upfront costs, they were still able to
have their rights vindicated, even if they had to arbitrate individually.229
Likewise, the defendant in the Seventh Circuit case, Livingston v. Associates
Fin., Inc., agreed to pay all of the plaintiff’s arbitration fees.230
The second important commonality in the decisions of these other four
circuit courts is that all of the plaintiffs were bringing claims against banks or
financial institutions under the TILA.231 In contrast, the Kristian plaintiffs
brought their claims under state and federal antitrust law.232 In analyzing the
differences between the cases, the Kristian court focused on the Third Circuit

226. Livingston v. Associates Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[H]aving found
the Arbitration Agreement enforceable we must give full force to its terms . . . . The Arbitration
Agreement at issue here explicitly precludes . . . class claims or pursuing [class mechanisms].”);
Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2002) (“We also reject [the
plaintiff’s] argument that the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable as unconscionable because
without the class action vehicle, she will be unable to maintain her legal representation given the
small amount of her individual damages.”); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 244 F.3d 814,
819 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e hold that a contractual provision to arbitrate TILA claims is
enforceable even if it precludes a plaintiff from utilizing class action procedures in vindicating
statutory rights under TILA.”); Id. at 55–56; see also Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d
366, 379 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Because there is not irreconcilable conflict between arbitration and the
goals of the TILA, we similarly hold that claims arising under the EFTA [Electronic Fund
Transfer Act] may also be subject to arbitration notwithstanding the desire of a plaintiff who
previously consented to arbitration to bring his or her claims as part of a class.”).
227. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 56 (1st Cir. 2006).
228. Id. (citing Johnson, 225 F.3d at 374).
229. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 374–75.
230. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 56 (citing Livingston, 339 F.3d at 557).
231. Id.
232. Id.
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case Johnson v. West Suburban Bank.233 This is because the other circuit court
decisions relied on the precedent set forth in Johnson.234
The Third Circuit in Johnson relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in
In Gilmer, the plaintiff
Gilmer v. Livingston/Johnson Lane Corp.235
challenged arbitration on the grounds that it did not permit class
mechanisms.236 The Supreme Court held that because the plaintiff, who
brought an age discrimination case, could effectively vindicate his statutory
rights in the arbitral forum, arbitration should be compelled.237 The Third
Circuit extended this holding relating to the ADEA to claims brought under
TILA.238 The cases reflect both that the parties contracted to arbitrate and that
so long as plaintiffs could enforce their statutory rights through arbitration, the
contract provision would be upheld.239 In Johnson, because the plaintiff was
able to recover attorney’s fees and costs, could also have his rights enforced
through administrative means, and would not have necessarily received a
greater recovery by proceeding as a member of a class, the court upheld the bar
on class mechanisms.240
Ultimately, the reasons the Third Circuit used to uphold the ban on class
mechanisms in the arbitral forum did not apply to the plaintiff’s antitrust
claims in Kristian.241 First, there is a fundamental difference between
litigating TILA claims and antitrust claims because antitrust claims are far
more involved and complex. Generally, under TILA a specific act or
transaction is in dispute.242 Because TILA claims normally involve a specific
act, they involve a more simplistic analysis. However, determining whether a
company violated state and federal antitrust laws requires looking at the
businesses actions as a whole,243 which entails looking much deeper in a much
more complicated, expensive and time consuming analysis.244 Likewise, the
antitrust laws themselves are very complex and difficult to comprehend. This
fact is bolstered by uncontested expert affidavits submitted by plaintiffs that
detail the time consumption, expense and labor required to prosecute antitrust
claims.245 One unopposed expert with twenty-six years of experience litigating

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id.
Id.
Kristian, 446 F.3d at 56.
Id. at 56; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
Kristian, 446 F.3d at 56.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 56–57.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 57.
Kristian, 446 F.3d at 58.
Id.
Id.
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class actions stated that in order to prosecute the antitrust claims plaintiffs
would have to undertake:
[D]efining the relevant product market, defining the relevant geographic
market, establishing the market power of defendants and the manner in which
they exercised such power; the effects of potential competition within the
relevant markets; the impact of conduct on any non-incumbent cable providers
in the relevant market; analyzing the ‘swapping’ agreements alleged in the
Complaint, as well as merger and purchase of asset transactions that
defendants may have been involved in relating to the alleged monopolization
conduct; reviewing and analyzing the increases in cable subscription rates over
time; establishing Comcast’s alleged monopoly overcharges in relevant
246
markets; and further calculating the named plaintiffs’ damages.

Expert fees alone were estimated to range from $300,000 to over
$600,000.247 This cost did not even take into account additional fees such as
computer analysis or air travel reimbursements.248 Nor does it take into
account attorney’s fees or court costs, none of which are recoverable under
Comcast’s arbitration agreement.249 Most importantly, considering the huge
expense alone, which one expert estimated could reach into the millions, the
individual recovery for a plaintiff would likely range from a few hundred to a
few thousand dollars.250 Based on the foregoing, it is highly unlikely that
consumer antitrust plaintiffs, such as those in Kristian, would bring claims if
precluded from using class mechanisms.
Second, unlike in Johnson, antitrust consumers like those in Kristian will
be unable to find representation because, unlike claims brought under TILA,
attorney’s fees and costs are not recoverable under Comcast’s arbitration
agreement.251 As explained above, the cost for the Kristian plaintiffs is
substantial and an attorney would have to have hundreds of thousands to
millions of dollars to invest upfront for only a few hundred to few thousand
dollars likely to be recovered. Considering the uncertainty as to whether
plaintiffs will win or lose on their claim, the attorneys could potentially lose
over a million dollars, have no guarantees, and see nothing in return.252
Therefore, it was highly unlikely that any attorney would be willing to
represent an individual plaintiff against Comcast.253

246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 58.
249. Id. at 50.
250. Id. at 58.
251. Id. at 57–60.
252. Id. at 59 (Plaintiffs’ expert, Howard J. Sedran, noted that “[i]t should not surprise anyone
that a qualified attorney would not pursue a few individual cases on a contingent basis where
even a victory would result in the loss of millions of dollars of time and expense.").
253. Id. at 59.
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For this reason alone there was sufficient support for the court to find the
arbitration agreement unenforceable. Several courts have struck down class
action waivers in arbitration agreements where the recovery is so small that no
reasonable person would bring a claim.254 The courts in these cases have
realized that “by increasing plaintiff’s transaction costs, defendants can induce
them to accept lower settlements or even drop their claims altogether.”255
Requiring arbitration and banning class mechanisms is contrary to the Supreme
Court’s justification for class actions: that it is often irrational or impractical
for individuals to bring claims when recoveries are small and costs are
prohibitive.
Finally, unlike in Johnson, it was unlikely that administrative enforcement
of antitrust claims would remedy the plaintiffs’ injuries.256 When Congress
enacts a statue and calls for both private and administrative enforcement of the
statute, it envisions both will play a role in ensuring the law is followed and
carried out.257 Where private enforcement is virtually impossible, Congress’s
intent is undermined and true enforcement is unlikely to exist.258
Based on the huge differences in complexity, cost, and other methods of
enforcement between TILA claims and antitrust claims, the reasoning used by
the Third Circuit could not apply in Kristian.259 Therefore, because the bar on
plaintiffs’ use of class mechanism precludes them from enforcing their
statutory rights, they could not be compelled to arbitrate their claims if forced
to do so individually.260
H. Other Courts
In its final point of analysis, the court in Kristian supported its position
with the holdings of other courts.261 For the most part, those courts refusing to
compel arbitration where class mechanisms are banned are state courts who are
applying state unconscionability statutes.262 The Kristian court stated that
because “many unconscionability arguments are merely reiterations of
vindication of statutory rights arguments,” they are equally supportive of its
holding.263

254. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 59.
255. Id. (quoting Jean B. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate
Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 86 (2004)).
256. Id. at 57–60.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 57–59.
260. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 59.
261. Id. at 60.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 63.
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One example of a similar unconscionability argument is the Ninth Circuit
holding in Ting v. AT&T.264 In Ting, the court held that arbitration could not
be enforced where there was a ban on class mechanisms, pursuance of
individual claims was not economically feasible, and no claims were likely to
be brought absent the availability of class mechanisms.265 The court also noted
that even if a claim were brought a plaintiff would be highly unlikely to find an
attorney willing to handle the case where attorney’s fees and costs were not
recoverable under the arbitration agreement.266 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit
held that a ban on class mechanisms in the arbitral forum was such a deterrent
to litigation of claims that the corporate defendant was essentially shielded
from all liability.267 The court in Kristian, relying on Ting, also found that
because plaintiffs had no way to vindicate their statutory rights if unable to
bring their claims against Comcast as a class, Comcast would be able to shield
itself from liability.268 Moreover, this would frustrate the enforcement of
antitrust laws because all of Comcast’s subscribers with similar claims either
would be unable to withstand the cost to bring claims individually or would be
able to find representation.269
I.

The Kristian Court’s Conclusion

Ultimately, the court severed the portions of the arbitration agreement
banning class mechanisms. However, the arbitration agreement itself was not
severed. Plaintiffs were therefore compelled to arbitrate but were permitted to
do so on a class-wide basis.
V. EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF KRISTIAN
Due to the unsteady history and inherent distrust of arbitration, courts have
struggled with the enforcement of arbitration agreements for the past
century.270 While congressional adoption of the FAA in 1925 and a federal
policy very much in favor of arbitration have reinforced the validity and
enforceability of arbitration, courts are still weary to enforce it in situations
involving mandatory arbitration agreements in contracts of adhesion between
corporations and ordinary consumers.271 The result for courts has been several

264. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
265. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 60.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 60–61; see also Ting v. AT&T, 182 F.Supp.2d 902, 918 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(Plaintiffs had complaints about AT&T’s billing system and practices. Their recovery
expectations were minimal.).
268. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 61.
269. Id.
270. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 11–13.
271. Id. at 10–13.
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decades of unclear case law which shirks the major issues altogether.272 For
this reason, Kristian v. Comcast, the second federal circuit court case to find
bans on class arbitration unenforceable and the first to find so on a theory of
vindication of statutory rights, is important and insightful.
Though Kristian is a novel holding and helps to elucidate a controversial
area of law, even on adoption by the Supreme Court or other courts it is
unlikely to have much impact on the law for two primary reasons. First, where
an arbitration agreement is silent, Supreme Court precedent in Bazzle and
Howsam indicates that a procedural issue of arbitrability is present and the
proper decision-maker is an arbitrator.273 Second, even where class actions are
explicitly banned, Kristian may not apply as it is likely to be read narrowly.
First, under Bazzle and Howsam, where an arbitration agreement is silent
and the only issue is whether arbitration can proceed as a class, an arbitrator,
not a court, is the proper decision-maker.274 Therefore, if a corporation wishes
to avoid judicial review of its arbitration agreement, it need only remain silent
as to whether class actions are barred. The Supreme Court in Bazzle never got
to the merits of the case nor determined whether class actions could be barred
because they determined there was not an issue of arbitrability for them to
decide.275 Because there is such a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration
and because the FAA requires arbitration agreements to be considered
equivalent to any other contractual provision, this must be the case.276
In Kristian, if Comcast had not explicitly barred class mechanisms the
First Circuit’s only allowable action, if abiding by Supreme Court precedent,
would be to apply the holding of Bazzle and leave interpretation of the contract
to an arbitrator. Therefore, if courts begin following Kristian, corporations
wishing to stay out of court would likely remain silent on the issue of class
mechanisms. Because an arbitrator would not be bound by the First Circuit’s
holding, and because the great weight of authority is contrary to the Kristian
decision, it is not possible to determine whether arbitration on a class-wide
basis would be allowed or prohibited.
In the end, arbitration has proven to be equally fair to both major
corporations and individual consumers, so there need not be a fear that a major
conglomerate will be able to stifle the rights of consumers indefinitely.277
However, it is not clear that Kristian would greatly impact the law.

272. See generally Kaplinsky, supra note 5; Lipshutz, supra note 5.
273. See generally Kristian, 446 F.3d at 40–50.
274. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452–53 (2003); Howsam v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002).
275. See Kristian, 446 F.3d at 41. See generally Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
276. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 11; see also PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 11, at
5; Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1679.
277. See generally Dawson, supra note 4; Lipshutz, supra note 5.
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Additionally, because there is no record as in judicial decisions, it would not be
as persuasive as in a judicial court, even if followed.
If the effect of Kristian and subsequent cases decided similarly encourages
companies to leave their arbitration agreements vague so that the only issues
will be of procedural arbitrability, there are several implications. First, absent
congressional direction as to whether arbitration can proceed as a class and
when it cannot, arbitrators will have great discretion to determine whether or
not class mechanisms may be prohibited. One negative aspect of this scenario
is that arbitrators have less experience in certifying and managing class
actions.278 In cases where class arbitration has been permitted, such as in
California, judges have kept a watchful eye and ensured that notice,
certification and management of the class was as prescribed.279 Also, class
actions can be dangerous in arbitration because they are more private and
notice is more difficult.280 Because of the opt-out provision in Rule 23(b)(3), it
becomes more worrisome that a future litigant will be unable to bring a valid
claim because they were joined to a class, unaware, left without recovery, and
were subsequently bound by the arbitrators decision.281 Moreover, this result
would undermine the very policy at the core of arbitration that the parties agree
to arbitrate and agree to be bound.282 Under Rule 23(b)(3), it is possible that a
person never intended to be bound but nonetheless is. However, this can
hardly be used to attack class actions as the policies under arbitration have
eroded such that an arbitration provision hidden in small print on the back of a
standard form contract are sufficient to bind plaintiffs.283
Second, even if Kristian is adopted by the Supreme Court or all other
courts, it is not likely to greatly impact the law because it will likely be read
narrowly. Ultimately, the effect of Kristian for all courts wishing to mirror its
decision is that for every type of claim there must be analysis as to whether
arbitration can fairly proceed on a class-wide basis.
The First Circuit went to considerable lengths to discover whether in
Kristian, which dealt with antitrust claims, Plaintiffs were unable to vindicate
their statutory rights.284 By the court’s own admission, antitrust law is a very
analytical and complex area of law that requires extensive research and
analysis to determine whether there has been a violation.285 Due to its

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
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Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1690.
Id. at 1691.
Id. at 1717.
Id. at 1714.
See PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 11, at 2.
See Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, 857 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 2006).
See generally Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006).
Id. at 57.
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complexity and the absence of provisions allowing for attorney’s fees to be
recovered, antitrust law is especially expensive and unique.286
The Supreme Court, while not providing many clear answers, has already
stated that in certain cases, such as ADEA cases (i.e., Gilmer), plaintiffs are
not disadvantaged by having to bring claims individually.287 While the
Supreme Court noted its holding may not be the most fair or convenient
solution for consumers, the parties had the ability under both the FAA and
contract law to choose their dispute settlement procedure.288 The First Circuit
only held as it did because, unlike ADEA claims, antitrust law is so much more
complex, requires more sophisticated analysis, and does not allow for recovery
of attorney’s fees.289
In fact, Kristian does little to clarify the law for corporations or consumers
dealing with arbitration disputes. The only clear guideline from Kristian is that
under state and federal antitrust law, plaintiffs are precluded from vindicating
their statutory rights if class mechanisms are barred because the cost of
litigation is so prohibitive and the availability of counsel is limited. Because
the Supreme Court, and several other circuit courts, have already considered
the same issue in other contexts, they are likely to be more determinative than
Kristian.290
If a plaintiff in another circuit brings the same or similar case, there is no
guarantee that a federal court will rely on the First Circuit’s decision because it
does not bind the other circuits and is in the minority in comparison to other
federal circuit courts that have considered the issue. Even if a comparable case
comes to the First Circuit, the court will again have to reweigh every factor to
determine whether the case is more like Kristian and antitrust law, or more like
an ADEA or TILA claim, which the vast majority of federal courts hold can
bar class arbitration.
Finally, if courts, corporations and consumers are unhappy with the fact
that all arbitration provisions could potentially be silent on whether class
actions can be precluded and thus go to arbitration, then Congress, the body
that enacted the FAA in 1925, should be called on to correct the problem.
Congress has the authority to state whether arbitration can proceed on a classwide basis or can strengthen the Kristian decision by providing examples of
the types of cases, such as antitrust cases, where arbitration can and should
proceed on a class-wide basis.
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Id. at 57–59.
Id. at 42.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991).
Kristian, 446 F.3d at 64.
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CONCLUSION
In sum, arbitration has created conflict among the courts for the past
century. While the First Circuit’s decision in Kristian is novel and seems
contradictory to that in other circuits, in reality, it is not. The First Circuit
went to considerable effort to elucidate the differences between antitrust law
and other areas of law under which such claims had been brought before, such
as ADEA or TILA. It is unlikely that if the First Circuit were to consider
whether arbitration could proceed absent class mechanisms in a claim brought
under TILA or ADEA, it would find the agreement unenforceable.
Nonetheless, Kristian is an important case and will likely prove to be a guiding
light as courts continue to define the bounds of arbitration law absent Supreme
Court and congressional guidance. If anything, Kristian reflects that the debate
among the courts is far from over and more likely that not, will continue to
create divisions.
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